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There is an ongoing discussion about whether entrepreneurship is basically an innate gift 
or whether education has a traceable effect on the quality and success of entrepreneurs. This 
paper tries to put these hypotheses to test by means of a comparison of English and Spanish 
businessmen. Based on a large database, and using descriptive analysis and econometric tests it 
shows that although the educational systems in both countries are quite different, entrepreneurs 




The role of the entrepreneur in economic development is well established since 
Schumpeter published his Theory of Economic Development almost a century ago (1911) and 
perhaps since Von Thünen wrote his Isolated estate in 1826. One could even go back to 
Cantillon (1755) and Adam Smith (1776). Cantillon’s definition of the entrepreneur is of 
remarkable modernity as we will see later on. Entrepreneurial studies are proliferating lately and 
a question which is cropping up often is: what moves entrepreneurs? Of course we know that the 
profit motive is the chief drive but the present question is a little more refined: what makes a 
successful entrepreneur? Or, in other words: is it just a matter of genes, or drive, or calling, or are 
there more general factors (social, psychological) which move people to become entrepreneurs; 
and not only this: what makes entrepreneurs successful? We will argue (as Cantillon does, by the 
way) that almost everybody has played the role of entrepreneur at some moment or other. The 
question is, why are some successful and others no? What makes some behave in a certain way 
and others differently?  
About these and somewhat related topics there has recently been debate among Spanish 
economic historians. One of us wrote years ago about “the weakness of the Spanish 
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entrepreneurial spirit” [Tortella (2000), p. 207]. Other writers have debated this statement. 
García Sanz [(1996), pp. 111-113], for instance, criticized it while apparently not in total 
disagreement. Other authors seemed to agree at least in a general way. Carreras and Tafunell, for 
instance, have written that “there has never been in Spain a <managerial revolution>” [Carreras 
and Tafunell (1999), p. 301]. Many others could be cited.  
The historical reasons for this weakness of the entrepreneurial spirit in Spain (there is 
agreement that the situation has improved recently) are worth studying by themselves and also to 
better understand Spanish economic history and that of other developing countries. We do not 
think that Spaniards are different in ability or industriousness from at least neighboring peoples, 
but there may be geographical or historical reasons which may explain some differential traits. 
While Spain cannot boast inventor-entrepreneurs of the stature of Marconi, Edison, Watt, 
Bessemer, Siemens, Chardonnet, etc., there are a few remarkable individuals in Spanish history 
of similar inventor-entrepreneurial nature, such as Narciso Monturiol and Isaac Peral (both 
invented submarines in the nineteenth century), Juan de la Cierva (invented the autogiro, a 
forerunner of the helicopter), Damià Mateu (launched the Hispano-Suiza automobile early in the 
twentieth century with a motor designed by Mark Birkigt, a Swiss engineer living in Barcelona, 
early in the twentieth century), Alejandro Goicoechea (invented the Talgo train), and Leonardo 
Torres Quevedo, who devised calculating machines and chess-playing robots, and the still 
functioning Niagara aerocar in the late nineteenth century. Almost a constant in the history of 
these individuals (save perhaps Goicoechea) was incomprehension and lack of response on the 
part of Spanish society. One detects here more a social than a genetic problem. 
Carreras and Tafunell have tried to explain the reasons for the rarity of big business and 
other peculiarities of Spanish enterprise. They adduce three main explanations: first, small 
market size; second, lack of comparative advantages in sectors where big business thrives; and, 
third, lack of a “real entrepreneurial culture” and the lateness with which business schools 
appeared [Carreras and Tafunell (1996), p. 90 and (1999), pp. 302 and 299]. Let us say in a few 
words that the first explanation is unconvincing. If narrowness of the domestic market were an 
explanation for the absence of big business, how could we explain the existence of big 
multinationals in Switzerland, Sweden, or the Netherlands? The second explanation is not very 
convincing either: why should oranges and fruits, minerals, or olive oil, all products in which 
Spain has a natural advantage, not be conducive to big business? There are multinationals in food 
products, in drinks and spirits, in cork, in minerals, and in other products which Spain exports or 
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has exported. The only plausible and intriguing explanation is the third one. Social factors, 
among them the educational system, are worth studying further. For unknown reasons, Carreras 
and Tafunell reject that education should have something to do with the weakness of the 
entrepreneurial spirit in Spain. Thus, in a recent synthesis they edited on Spanish entrepreneurial 
history [Carreras, Tafunell and Torres Villanueva (2003), p. 334 (our translation)], they state 
that: 
 
Educational retardation cannot be considered as an obstacle to the appearance of 
entrepreneurs, since it is conceivable that tradition and on-the-job learning could be 
adequate channels for attaining the knowledge needed to carry out entrepreneurial 
initiatives. 
 
One is surprised by the total lack of evidence offered to support so radical an assertion. 
We hope to be able to show in the following pages that education has indeed an influence on 
entrepreneurial callings and on the ways they developed. 
There is no doubt that the topic is complex. There is a continuous feedback between 
economic growth at large and the entrepreneurial spirit. As we hinted before, entrepreneurship 
has developed in twentieth-century Spain. Tortella himself has written: “It cannot be doubted 
that the entrepreneurial spirit has not been lacking in twentieth-century Spain” [In Torres 
Villanueva (2000), p. 15]. Even so, another specialist in the topic has written [Guillén (2005), p. 
8]: 
 
Spain has become a fully developed country from the theory’s point of view, while 
lagging seriously behind other major countries in terms of technological and marketing 
expertise. 
 
The behavior of Spanish present-day multinationals is not exactly what one would expect 
according to the country’s level of development. Adds Guillén [Ibid., p. 227]: 
 
Spain is the only “advanced” country that spends more on lotteries than on R&D. In fact, 
lottery expenditure [...] stands at nearly twice R&D expenditure [...] While in the OECD 
as a whole businesses contribute two-thirds of total R&D expenditure, in Spain they only 
contribute about half. The reasons why Spanish firms do not spend enough on R&D are 
not well understood. 
 
In spite of all the progress, Spanish businessmen still mistrust the profitability of 
investing in science and technology. And if this is the present situation, when the country’s 
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economy is among the largest in the world, one may imagine what the situation was before, and 
ask to what extent this type of attitudes may have played a role in the slowness of Spain’s 
development and whether it is possible that they may still be an obstacle in the future. This is 
why a look at the education of entrepreneurs from a long-run standpoint and from a comparative 
perspective may yield some results.  
It should be added that this discussion is not limited to Spain. In many other countries the 
issue of the economic role of education and of its role in the formation of the entrepreneurial 
spirit is going on and perhaps nowhere as much as in England. Among the most notable are the 
writings of Aldcroft, Coleman, Fox, Jeremy, and Sanderson [See, for instance, Aldcroft (1990), 
Coleman (1973) and the articles collected in Tortella (1990) and Núñez and Tortella (1993)]. It is 
interesting that while in England, the cradle of the Industrial Revolution and still one of the 
economic leaders in the world, scholars debate bitterly about “Education and Britain’s Growth 
Failure” as one of Aldcroft’s articles is entitled, the problem should be declared non-existent by 
leading Spanish scholars. 
This is not an exclusively Spanish problem, however. There is an established scholarly 
tradition which sustains, on very shaky evidence, that education has little to do with economic 
growth. American scholars such as David Mitch and Harvey Graff belong to this school and in 
Italy Renato Giannetti, in an authoritative survey [Giannetti (1997)] also holds this outlook. We 
are not going to go into this complex discussion here, and refer to a book edited fifteen years ago 
[Núñez and Tortella (1993)]. Let us go back from this excursus into the actual research we have 
been carrying out.  
 
Method and Sources 
Our main source are Biographical Dictionaries, whose number, fortunately, is increasing 
everyday. So far we have processed the data of 288 Spanish and 1,712 British businessmen 
culled from the books by Torres Villanueva (2000), Vidal Olivares (2005) and Cabana (2006) for 
Spain and Jeremy (1984-1986) and Jeremy (1994) (which we will call JI and JII for short) for 
Britain. 
For Spain were have therefore three volumes. Those of Vidal Olivares and Cabana are 
regional and deal with Valencian and Catalan businessmen respectively, while Torres Villanueva 
studies one hundred Spanish businessmen whose activity took place in the twentieth century.  
Vidal Olivares’ and Cabana’s volumes also include nineteenth-century biographies and all three 
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of them are supposed to deal with the most distinguished individuals in their respective regions 
and periods. The Spanish subsets, therefore, are rather distinct. The “Spanish” group is limited to 
the twentieth century but, being a subset from a wider population than those of the regional 
dictionaries, it offers a richer variety of sectors of activity, whereas Catalan and Valencian 
biographies are more concentrated upon consumer industries: food and textiles. (We are now 
processing data from Carmona (2006) and material from other unpublished volumes kindly made 
available by Editorial LID). 
The Dictionary of David Jeremy (JI) offers some 1,200 biographies of British 
businessmen grouped into five volumes. Its time span is 1860-1980; this is the period when the 
entrepreneurs were active; some were born even before 1800. The selection criterion is 
territorial: these were businessmen operating in England and Wales; Scotland and Ireland are 
therefore excluded. This does not mean, however, that there are no individuals from these areas; 
there are, provided they worked mostly in England and Wales; the same goes for foreigners such 
as Americans (U.S. and Canada) and Germans of which there is a fair number. The same 
authors’ (with Geoffrey Tweedale) Dictionary of Twentieth Century Business Leaders (London 
1994), what we will call JII, offers 750 biographies of twentieth-century British business leaders, 
of which 209 are included in JI. 
We have so far extracted a sample of 1,712 biographies from the Jeremy books (JI and 
JII) and 288 from the Spanish books (not 300 because there is some overlapping). In the British 
sample we have made a distinction between those businessmen who acted rather as managers 
than pure entrepreneurs (i.e., as salaried employees rather than risk-takers). In the Spanish case 
we have sometimes separated the one-hundred (101, actually) elite twentieth-century 
entrepreneurs from the regional businessmen because there are reasons to assume that these are 
two distinct subsets. We have also selected two elite groups (i.e., those we consider as the most 
distinguished and accomplished) among British businessmen, 100 for the nineteenth-century 
(1830-1918) and 102 for the twentieth (1919-1980). The criteria utilized in the selection of the 
English elite samples have been social prominence, economic achievement, technical 
achievement, and versatility. A list of our English elite samples is available in the Appendix A. 
We must say that although about 10 percent of the cases were borderline, the bulk of individuals 
seemed quite obvious and straightforward cases. 
Our samples show certain limitations of which we are conscious. The first and 
fundamental problem is that devising an unbiased sample of entrepreneurs is impossible. We are 
 
 6 
dealing in both cases with a distinguished group of entrepreneurs-businessmen whose careers 
and successes were doubtless above average. One difficulty in this connection lies in that the 
border between entrepreneurs and non-entrepreneurs is wide and blurred. First, the distinction 
that we have made between managers and entrepreneurs is not watertight (although undeniable). 
Second, even the definition of entrepreneur is imprecise. Many scholars consider that what 
defines an entrepreneur is the willingness to take risks and the ability to adapt to (and take 
advantage of) unexpected situations. Yet this can also be said about surgeons, boat skippers, 
airplane pilots, policemen, truck drivers, even orchestra conductors. Furthermore, a vast majority 
of people have undertaken entrepreneurial activities at some point in their lives, have engaged in 
some kind of business: just making decisions about one’s estate is an entrepreneurial activity: 
buying or selling a house, contracting a mortgage, borrowing or lending, all these are 
entrepreneurial activities which most adults (and some teenagers) assume with greater or lesser 
frequency. We are interested in full-time entrepreneurs, but even these are difficult to tell apart 
from part-time entrepreneurs, and frequently in our samples we find individuals who became 
entrepreneurs gradually, and, in some cases, intermittently. We must, therefore, not only define 
the entrepreneur as a risk-taker and somebody able to take advantage of and adapt to unexpected 
situations, but also somebody who obtains profit by combining factors of production within the 
framework of a market. Purely professional activities, however profitable, are not 
entrepreneurial. This is why we think that a pure manager is not a real entrepreneur, but rather a 
professional. Let me say en passant that these notions are not new. Richard Cantillon 
characterized the entrepreneur as the person whose customers paid extra to avoid the risk and the 
bother of storing the merchandise they were going to consume in the future; thus the income of 
entrepreneurs was uncertain (gages incertains), and this is why they were so often bankrupt 
[Cantillon (1952; orig. edn. 1755), pp. 22-31]. Thirdly, what makes an entrepreneur well known 
is success. You do not find entrepreneurial biographies of failed businessmen (unless they have 
been involved in titillating scandals); most often failed businessmen abandon business. So the 
fact of being studied already presupposes a measure of success, of being above average. Simple 
continuity in business already implies success. 
In consequence of all this, we do not worry too much about sample bias. We think that 
“average entrepreneur” is an elusive concept and, after all, we are not trying to understand the 
average entrepreneur, but rather what makes a successful entrepreneur, since we believe that 
entrepreneurial success is conducive to social welfare. As the econometrician in our team said, if 
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we want to know what makes horses run we should study thoroughbreds. 
For these reasons we have frequently made comparisons between our 101 twentieth-
century Spanish entrepreneurs and the two similar groups of elite English entrepreneurs referred 
to before. 
The variables we have selected for the following exercises are: first, studies: secondary, 
vocational, apprenticeships, college-level and university studies; within college and university 
studies we have taken into account field of study (law, medicine, engineering, etc.); we have also 
tried to take into account not only quantity (years studied) but also quality (for instance, in 
England public schools are supposed to be superior to grammar schools at the secondary level 
and we have considered them separately); second, family relations: whether there is a business 
saga, business-related marriage, to what extent family background has determined the business 
activity of our entrepreneurs, etc.; third, we have studied the versatility or adaptability of the 
entrepreneur, measured by the number of fields (such as banking, textiles, food, electricity, etc.) 
in which the agent operated; finally, we have taken into account other activities not strictly 
entrepreneurial, such as teaching or research, politics, religion, philanthropy, professional 
associationism, prizes, titles of nobility, patronage, etc. 
For us the main explanatory variable is education, although not the only one. Family 
related variables may also be used as explanatory, and some social indicators, such as religion, 
country or region of origin, may be so used also, although our problem with religion now is that 
this variable does not apply in the Spanish case. The dependent variables are those that refer to 
entrepreneurial performance: versatility (sector and number of sectors), plus other non strictly 
professional, such as political and other social activities. These variables should reflect the 
contribution of entrepreneurs to social welfare. Since the ability to adapt, according to Casson 
[Cassis and Minoglou (2005), pp. 28 and 54] ) is one of the key attributes of entrepreneurs, 
versatility is one of our key indicators of quality of the entrepreneurial factor, as adaptation often 
will entail transferring factors from one sector to another. In a second stage of our analysis we 
have qualified or weighted versatility in two ways. First, technological depth: some sectors are 
more technologically “sophisticated” than others: e.g., chemicals and electricity have greater 
“technological depth” than food or textiles. Second, some sectors have shown a stronger demand 
than others in recent years: computers or some services, for instance, have seen their demand 
increase at a faster pace than clothing, say, or furniture. Therefore we have weighted sectors so 
as to take these nuances into account on the assumption that entrepreneurs working in sectors 
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that are technologically deeper and in higher demand make a better contribution to overall 
economic growth and welfare. Finally, we have also considered that belonging to our elite 
samples is an indication of entrepreneurial success and have considered it as a dependent 
variable in some of our econometric exercises. 
Preliminary Results 
Tables C.1.1, C.1.2 and C.1.3 show that the elite groups in both countries had rather 
dissimilar levels in their studies: in all, the Spaniards had a higher level of college-level studies 
than the English, but also a higher proportion of entrepreneurs with low levels of study. For 
university studies, Spaniards could boast more than half elite entrepreneurs while the proportion 
was lower in the English samples. Spanish businessmen, therefore, tended to be considerably 
more polarized in terms of their education. There were few of them with secondary education 
who did not go on to the university. 
In raw terms English entrepreneurs have been commonly depicted  as having relatively 
low levels of formal education until quite recently. This was already pointed out in a pioneering 
study by De Miguel and Linz [(1964)] who compared a Spanish sample with samples of English, 
US, and French businessmen. They found that Spanish and French entrepreneurs had higher 
standards of formal education than their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. The same has been observed 
more recently by Cassis [(1999), pp. 132-142] in a comparison of French, British, and German 
businessmen. The French had the highest levels, then the German, and the British came last. 
However, Cassis concludes that the differences in educational levels between British, French, 
and German business elites had little effect on business or economic performance. He argues that 
the differences among educational systems were less that usually thought. 
De Miguel and Linz did not conjecture about the possible meaning of these discrepancies 
of levels, although they pointed out that “the English educational system makes comparison 
difficult [...] What is the Spanish equivalent of the <Public Schools>, so exclusive and 
traditional, or of elite universities?” It is true that a mechanical comparison between Spanish and 
English educational levels omits very important qualitative aspects. England has a greater 
tradition of less formal learning (tutorials, independent primary schools, apprenticeships). And it 
is true that there are no equivalents in Spain to Public Schools (very select secondary schools, 
such as Eton, Harrow, Rugby, and others whose prestige is often higher than that of universities). 
Within universities, the distinction of some is far superior to that of others (Oxford and 
Cambridge, for instance) to extremes that are unknown in Spain. We have taken these questions 
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into account and have added two categories, “apprenticeship” and “public school”, among other 
explanatory variables. There are no public schools in Spain, and apprenticeships are less frequent 
than in England.  
In the following pages we will carry out two types of analysis. To start with, we will 
develop a descriptive survey making use of our elite samples and also our more extended ones, 
i.e., the Catalan and Valencian set plus the two wide English samples. And to finish we offer 
some econometric exercises which refine and, in our opinion, reinforce the conclusions from the 
descriptive survey. 
 
A) Descriptive analysis 
Tables C.1.1,C.1.2, and C.1.3, reflect the educational levels of entrepreneurs. If we add 
those without studies and those about whose studies we have no information in percentages we 
find that 34 percent of Spaniards probably had no studies above primary school (since the most 
probable is that “don’t know” means “no studies”) compared to 22 percent of Englishmen in the 
JI sample and 15 percent of twentieth-century English businessmen (JII).  However, the picture 
changes if we take university-level studies (Rows 7 to 13) into account. If we include 
“Unfinished university studies” (Row 13), over half (52.1 percent) of Spanish entrepreneurs had 
attended institutions of higher education whereas only 30.6 percent of English (JI) had. Even the 
JII sample of twentieth-century Englishmen exhibits a lower proportion of university trainees 
(48.1) than the Spanish sample. If we excluded those who had not finished their university 
studies, the proportions would not vary appreciably: 49.7 for Spain, and 26.9 for JI and 45.9 for 
JII. This is one of the big differences between Spanish (more generally, continental) and British 
entrepreneurs: whereas Spaniards went to the university, Englishmen had more practical modes 
of training in mind. It is possible that this may be due to the character deliberately humanistic 
and anti-utilitarian of English universities, especially the top ones, until well into the twentieth 
century, as contrasted with French and German universities, more inclined to experimental 
sciences and to being in contact with industry. John Stuart Mill, no less, in an Inaugural as 
Rector of St Andrews University in 1867 said the following: 
 
There is a tolerably general agreement about what a university is not. It is not a 
place of professional education. Universities are not intended to teach the knowledge 
required to fit men for some special mode of gaining a livelihood. Their object is not to 





Mill admitted that there was a social demand for engineers and “industrial arts”, but he 
thought these matters should be taught elsewhere, not at universities [Cited in Sanderson (1972), 
p. 5]. Continental universities did not emphasize this distinction: the Polytechnic institutes 
(Spanish “Escuelas especiales,” French “Écoles Polytechniques,” German Hochschulen, 
American Institutes of Technology -MIT, Caltech) were considered part of the universities, 
although somewhat autonomous, or akin to universities. This reticence on the part of English 
universities to embrace technological institutes until relatively recently has been acerbically 
criticized by British specialists (Sanderson, Aldcroft, Coleman).  
In exchange, the proportion of English businessmen having gone through apprenticeship 
was 28.2 percent in the JI sample, more than double the Spanish case, 12.2. The proportion was 
also higher in the JII sample: 17.9 percent. Furthermore, many English apprenticeships were 
“articled”, i.e., they carried practical studies in factories or firms and ended up in the acquisition 
of a title or degree, very frequently in engineering, but often also in accounting, law or actuarial 
science. In fact, those articled apprenticeships were not very different from  the studies in 
polytechnic schools in the continent. 
The other English specialty was the Public Schools, already mentioned above. These 
elite institutions of secondary education are considered by some as almost closer to universities 
than to ordinary secondary (“grammar”) schools. In many cases they have been considered as 
entrance doors to the best universities. In other cases their prestige was considered sufficient by 
their alumni to substitute for a college education, especially by those vowed to business and 
politics. Some 4.7 percent of English businessmen in our JI sample and 6.0 percent in JII studied 
in Public Schools and did not go on to college. Among elite businessmen the proportion was 4.0 
percent in the nineteenth century and 5.9 percent in the twentieth. 
Regional disparities among Spanish businessmen were considerable; unfortunately the 
only regional biographies we have processed so far relate to Catalonia and Valencia. The 
differences among these two  groups and with the Spanish elite group are considerable. The 
Valencia group had a distinctly lower level of university studies: only 39.5 percent, whereas the 
total Spanish average was 52.1. The Catalans were slightly above the average (55.2) and the 
Spanish elite group clearly above: 64.4, i.e., almost two in three elite businessmen had university 
studies. What is remarkable about Spanish businessmen is how low was the proportion of those 
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who had secondary studies but did not go on to college or university: about 2 percent. There are 
at least two reasons for this: 1) Almost no vocational study programs were (and are) available; 
and 2) access to university studies has always been easy and cheap for Spain’s middle classes. 
As to the degree of self-sufficiency of businessmen, we have established four categories: 
self-made, heirs, nearly-self made, and nearly-heirs. On one extreme are those entrepreneurs who 
created a successful firm or product by themselves or almost: we call them Self (or S) for short; 
on the other extreme are those who inherited an ongoing concern from close relatives; in most 
cases these entrepreneurs made the firm larger or more profitable, or branched out into other 
sectors, etc.; but they started out with a clear advantage: we call them Heirs (H); then we have 
two intermediate gradations: nearly self-made, those who had some help from relatives but 
created something different and fairly new (NS, nearly self); and those who received substantial 
family help but introduced considerable quantitative o qualitative changes (NH, nearly heirs). We 
have not had too much trouble classifying our subjects. As Tables C.2.1,C. 2.2, and C.2.3 show, 
Spanish entrepreneurs relied more on family networks than English: for the large samples, 49 
percent of Spanish entrepreneurs were self-made, and 57 percent of the English in the JI sample 
and 65 percent in the JII (all in all, 60 percent of English entrepreneurs were self-made).  
In the elite groups (Cols. 3 and 4 in Table C.2.1 and 7-10  in Table C.2.2) the English 
proportion was also slightly higher; 51 (53 percent for nineteenth-century entrepreneurs, 50 
percent for twentieth-century)against 48 percent for Spaniards. What is remarkable, but not 
surprising, is that among English managers (not entrepreneurs proper) the self-made were 78 
percent. These were people who owed their success to their skills; their level of studies was 
clearly higher than the average; as we said, these people were a mixture of entrepreneur cum 
professional. As to Spanish regional variations in the proportions of self-sufficiency, they are not 
remarkable. Valencians are slightly above average. Catalans more clearly below. One reason why 
this should be so is that Catalan industrialization preceded Valencian by almost a century, so that 
most Catalan entrepreneurs in the sample are already second generation, whereas many 
Valencians are beginners. 
Conversely, the proportion of heirs is larger among Spaniards than among English: 31 
percent versus 26 percent in the JI sample and 24 percent in the JII. This would seem natural, 
since Latin societies tend to have stronger family ties. The picture gets more blurred, however, if 
we focus upon elite groups: Spanish elite entrepreneurs received substantially less help from their 
families (heirs were less than one fourth, 23,8 percent), whereas elite English entrepreneurs 
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received about the same proportion of family help as in the larger sample: elite heirs were 29 
percent in the nineteenth century, 25 percent in the twentieth (26 percent in the larger sample). If 
we aggregate “heir” and “nearly heir” it turns out that, while in the large samples the proportion 
of heirs and near heirs was higher in the Spanish case (40.6) than in the English (37.5), the 
reverse is true for the elite samples: of the elite twentieth-century Spanish group only 35.6 
percent received substantial family help, whereas the proportions were 41.0 percent for the 
English nineteenth-century sample, 42.2 for the twentieth-century one. 
Turning to the economic sectors into which our agents worked, Table C.3.1 offers an 
interesting comparison. It shows the percentage of entrepreneurs from each national sample who 
worked in the different sectors. The structures are quite different. To start with, Spanish 
entrepreneurs were more concentrated in a few sectors, while the British were more evenly 
distributed. Then, the large Spanish sample (Col.1) shows a rather traditional sectoral  
distribution: Banking, Agriculture, Textiles, Building and Real Estate, Chemistry, and Commerce 
are the main sectors where Spanish businessmen worked; by contrast, British entrepreneurs were 
concentrated in Transportation, Metallurgy and Machinery, Commerce, Automobile and 
Aeronautics, Banking, Textiles, and Communication and Show Business. Aside from Banking 
and Commerce, which hardly denote modernity or tradition, the main sectors for Britain 
(Transportation, Metallurgy and Machinery, and Automobile and Aeronautics) are typical of an 
industrial economy, while of the main Spanish sectors only Textiles and Chemistry are genuinely 
industrial, with Textiles typical of the early industrial stages. Spanish industrialists seem to be 
highly specialized in Textiles, although there are a couple of surprises: Chemistry concentrated a 
higher proportion of Spanish than of British entrepreneurs, while there is more concentration in 
Mining in Britain than in Spain. The truth is that Chemicals have traditionally been a strong 
industry in Spain (and let us not forget that we are dealing with percentages, not absolute 
numbers). As to Mining, although the mineral richness of Spanish soils is (was) proverbial, two 
facts explain the largest concentration of British entrepreneurs: first the basis of British 
metallurgy was iron and coal mining; and second, many large Spanish mining companies were 
the property of Britons. Aside from these occasional exceptions, it is obvious that the 
occupational structure of entrepreneurs reflected the higher technical makeup of the British 
economy. Even the relatively larger size of British Communication and Show Business reflects 
the greater weight of the press and the publishing sector in Britain. 
Comparing the elite groups (Cols. 2, 4, and 5) the conclusions are similar, although with 
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some interesting nuances. Spanish elite businessmen are even more concentrated than those of 
the larger sample, and that mainly  in three sectors: Banking goes up from 14.2 to 18.4 percent; 
Food stays around 14 percent; and Building stays around 10.5 percent. The Textile sector, by 
contrast, goes down considerably, from 11.3 to 4.5. Commerce goes down considerably also, 
from 6.1 to 2.3, and, though in lesser proportions, so do Consumer Industries and 
Communication and Show Business. In exchange, other sectors become more crowded: Mining 
does so in a most clear way, attracting 5.0 of elite entrepreneurs, contrasted with 1.9 in the larger 
sample. The same happens in Iron and Steel (from 2.9 to 5.0), Chemistry (from 7.1 to 8.4), Power 
and Electrical Equipment, which combined go from 5.2 to 6.7), and Insurance (from 1.5 to 3.4). 
On the whole these changes confirm a well-known fact: Spanish big businessmen in the twentieth 
century inclined towards banking and heavy industry in a much greater degree than those on the 
lower echelons, who preferred consumer industries. 
English elite businessmen exhibit a more nuanced and complex picture. Here again, as in 
the larger sample, they show less sectoral concentration; the Table, furthermore, seems to exhibit 
a trend towards de-industrialization, something which is not present in Spanish elite 
entrepreneurs at all. English elite entrepreneurs in the twentieth century seem to veer towards the 
tertiary sector. Their most popular sector is Communication and Show Business, which goes 
from 7.0 percent in the nineteenth-century elite sample to 10.8 percent in the twentieth-century 
elite group; second comes Automobile and Aeronautics (from 3.5 to 10.5), a very large increase 
but largely due to the fact that these industries are typical of the twentieth century and almost 
unknown in the nineteenth. Another expanding sector is Food and Agriculture while the 
concentration in such traditional sectors as Metallurgy and Machine Building, Iron and Steel, and 
Textiles goes down. In exchange, Consumer industries go up. This sector includes home 
appliances and furniture, office machines and scientific and photographic instruments. Chemistry 
was the only heavy industry sector where elite businessmen were more concentrated in the 
twentieth than in the nineteenth century. Other sectors whose attraction for English elite 
entrepreneurs went up in the twentieth century are Insurance, Services (law, accounting, and 
tourism are the largest sub-sectors), and Transportation. The relative fall in Commerce obviously 
does not mean that the sectoral output went down, but probably that English retailing was not as 
innovative and dynamic in the twentieth century as it had been in the nineteenth.  
Comparison of the Spanish elite sample with the British elite samples of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries also yields interesting results. The Spanish concentration in Banking is 
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remarkable. We have already commented on that: it must be pointed out that the elite sample 
shows even more concentration in that sector than the larger sample. Compared to the English 
twentieth-century elite, the Spanish elite almost triples the degree of concentration in Banking. 
The second largest sector for the Spanish elite was Agriculture and Food Processing; it was a 
considerable sector in Britain too, and growing (compare with Col. 5). In both countries this 
sector must have a traditional element (weightier in Spain, no doubt) and another element related 
to retailing and modern food processing, and the trend must be the growth of the second at the 
expense of the first. Another sector which is disproportionally larger in the Spanish sample is 
Building and Real Estate. This must be related to the fact that Spanish population grew in the 
twentieth century at a faster rate than in the nineteenth and also experienced a marked 
improvement in its standard of living. The Spanish twentieth-century business elite was much 
more concentrated in heavy industry than the wider sample: such is the case of Power, 
Chemistry, Mining, and Iron and Steel. By contrast, British elite entrepreneurs tended to abandon 
the traditional heavy industry sectors: such is the case with Iron and Steel, Metallurgy and 
Machine Building, and Mining. Another traditionally very strong industry, British textiles, also 
declined from the nineteenth to the twentieth century. The trend towards a tertiary-sector 
economy in Britain is visible in the growth of Services (although small), Insurance, 
Transportation and, above all, Communication and Show Business (mostly publishing and 
cinema). The comparison of the elite samples, therefore, again shows the weight of traditional 
industries in Spain and the tertiarization of the British economy in the twentieth century. If we 
disaggregated further than the tables show, we would see that there was a larger proportion of 
twentieth-century British elite businessmen in Tourism (included in Services) than Spanish. 
The contrast between the elite samples is therefore rather eloquent. In twentieth-century 
Spain big business gravitated towards banking and heavy industry; in England it veered towards 
the tertiary sector and deserted heavy industry. The obvious explanation for this is the different 
degree of maturity of both economies. England was becoming post-industrial while Spain was 
industrializing.  
The tables of the 4th group reflect the correspondence between areas of study, with 
especial attention to university, and sectors of activity. Tables C.4.1.a, C.4.2.a, C.4.3.a, and 
C.4.4.a show the polarization in the studies of Spanish entrepreneurs: 33.7 percent had no 
secondary or university studies (or we have no information); at the other end, 52.1 percent had 
university studies. Only 14.2 percent had gone to secondary school or taken apprenticeship but 
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had no university studies.  This was in contrast with British entrepreneurs, where there was a 
large “middle stratum”.  Between the 22.2 of English entrepreneurs with “No studies” beyond 
primary school or “Unknown” and the 30.6 percent who went to college or university, there was 
almost half (47.2 percent) who had secondary studies or had taken an apprenticeship.  
The same polarization obtains for the Spanish elite sample (Tables C.4.2.), only here the 
weight of university studies is more considerable (64.3 percent), and that of lower education 
smaller (23.8) while the intermediate stratum is a paltry 11.9 percent. In contrast both English 
elite samples show a substantial proportion of businessmen with secondary education and no 
university or college studies (43.1 percent for the twentieth century sample, 57.0 for the 
nineteenth century one) 
In the wider Spanish sample, the second largest group was that of “No studies,” and those 
businessmen tended towards the traditional sectors: Food, Textiles, Building and Real Estate, and 
Commerce, in addition to Banking. As to those who had been apprenticed and therefore had not 
gone to the university but had had professional training, they again flocked towards the less 
technically sophisticated sectors: Textiles, Commerce, and Food, in addition to Banking, which 
was a sort of “joker card” sector. Commerce, is also somewhat of a portmanteau, in that it may 
span from high-level international trade cum finance activities to just plain peddling. Those with 
university studies are even more concentrated in Banking, Agriculture and Food, and Real Estate, 
but their presence in Chemicals, Communication and Show Business, Textiles, Transportation, 
and Iron and Steel is (with the exception of Textiles) much stronger than that of the other groups. 
The textile sector is more the preserve of those with lower levels of education. Examining fields 
of study in more detail (Table C.4.1.b), we see that the engineers are more concentrated in more 
technical sectors such as Power and Electrical Equipment, Chemistry, and Metallurgy and 
Machine Building, although also in Building and Real Estate (not too surprising, since the group 
includes Road and Bridge Engineers, and Architects) and in Banking and Agriculture and Food. 
The other large group of Spanish entrepreneurs with university studies is that of lawyers and 
economists. This is a versatile group: bankers predominate, but Agriculture and Food is a strong 
second, followed by Building and Real estate, with Textiles, Transportation, and Services 
somewhat behind. Obviously, social science students tended to be jacks-of-all-trades. The other 
groups were rather small, so just a brief comment should suffice: it seems logical that those with 
degrees in Sciences should concentrate in Chemicals.  
Let us now look at the lowest rows. The fourth row from bottom  gives us the total of 
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sectors and the third the total of individuals; the second row shows the quotient or ratio, i.e., the 
average number of sectors per businessman or, in other words, a simple indicator of versatility 
according to the area of study. In the last column we have the totals: last column, second row 
from bottom tells us that the average versatility of Spanish businessmen was 1.8 sectors per 
person. Engineers were above average, although in the lawyers and economists’ case, slightly 
below, the difference was probably not significant. Somewhat surprisingly, the other groups that 
are clearly above the average are those with other, not specified, university degrees (another 
portmanteau) and those who did not finish their studies, although these not much above average. 
All in all, however, these figures support our initial assumption: university studies (see Table 
C.4.1.a, Col. 5) make entrepreneurs more versatile, and also better able to tackle sectors that are 
more complex technically. This does not seem very surprising to us, but not much evidence of 
this sort has been gathered before. And, as we saw in the introduction, these results should 
surprise some scholars. 
Turning to Table C.4.3.a, we see the data relating to the wider English sample. English 
entrepreneurs seem to have been less versatile than the Spanish, for an average of 1.3 sectors for 
each individual. Those lacking university or secondary studies are concentrated upon Commerce, 
Transportation, and Textiles, very traditional sectors in England. As in the Spanish case, their 
versatility is below average. In general, the versatility of English businessmen is clustered around 
the average, with a few exceptions: those who did not finish their university studies were clearly 
less versatile than the average, those who graduated from Public School and those who studied 
sciences were clearly more versatile; those who studied economics and commerce were also 
about one percentage point above average. Public School students clustered around four sectors: 
Banking, Commerce, Transportation, and Metallurgy. There is no clear pattern here, save their 
versatility and their strong specialization in Banking (29 percent). Those who took an 
apprenticeship, articled or not, veered heavily towards Metallurgy and Machine Building, with 
Automobile and Aeronautics as a strong second, and Transportation in third place. No surprise 
here. Other sectors that those who had been apprenticed tended to were Building and Real Estate, 
 Textiles, Power and Electrical Equipment, and Commerce. The pattern here is a clear preference 
for the technical and mechanical industries. For those who graduated from college or university 
without a distinct specialization no clear pattern is discernible either: Transportation, Textiles, 
Mining, Banking are the main sectors, but there is a wide spread. 
Turning to our elite samples, Tables C.4.2.A and C.4.2.B depict Spanish entrepreneurs 
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and C.4.4.a, C.4.4.b and C.4.5.a and C.4.5.b describe English entrepreneurs. Some contrasts are 
telling: for instance, almost one quarter of our elite Spanish entrepreneurs had studied law, while 
of the 202  English elite entrepreneurs only 3 did, a paltry 1.5 percent. In exchange, 30 percent of 
elite English entrepreneurs had taken up apprenticeship, as contrasted with 10 percent of the 
Spanish. Another clear contrast is the proportion of elite entrepreneurs who took up secondary 
studies only: 14.9 percent of the English. If we add those who attended Public Schools, the 
combined percentage is 19.8 percent. By stark contrast, the proportion of Spanish elite 
entrepreneurs who did secondary studies only is 2 percent. We commented on this before.  
As expected, most of the elite Spaniards with no university training (including the ones 
we have no information about) gravitated towards more traditional sectors: Food, Building, 
Textiles, and Banking. By contrast engineers, while also prominent in Banking and Building, 
were almost equally conspicuous in Power and Electrical Equipment, Metallurgy, and Chemicals. 
It is interesting that engineers should be relatively numerous in Communication and Show 
Business. There is three of them in this sector, as many as in mining. This is due to a curious 
coincidence: one of the three in Communication and Show Business (Pau Salvat i Espasa) was 
the scion of a saga of book publishers who studied architecture (he designed the firm’s building) 
but in the end followed the family tradition; another (Nicolás Urgoiti) was an engineer who 
started out working for a paper mill and became a newspaper publisher. Lawyers, on the other 
hand, flocked to Banking (over one half of them) and Insurance. A little more surprising is that 
four of them should be in Iron and Steel.  
Elite English entrepreneurs were more evenly distributed. Banking was less prominent 
than among Spaniards and technical sectors more so. Those with no university or secondary 
education (or “no information”) were 17 percent of the total. They gravitated towards Commerce 
and to Communication and Show Business, but also towards Iron and Steel. A good example is 
William M. Aitken, Lord Beaverbrook, of Canadian origin, a self-made man with no university 
studies (he failed a Latin exam) who became a press tycoon in England. There are no comparable 
press magnates in Spain, although in our sample Urgoiti, Godó (a textile and newspaper saga) 
and Luca de Tena were the founders of relevant newspapers, two of them still extant. In large 
part the importance of this sector (Communication and Show Business) was due to the 
prominence not only of the press, but also of the theater and cinema in English society. Other 
sectors which attracted non-educated English elite entrepreneurs were general Services, and 
Textiles. Of the one third (66 individuals) of English elite entrepreneurs who undertook 
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university studies one sixth (24 percent) never finished. By contrast, 101 (50 percent) had 
secondary studies, apprenticeship, or went to Public Schools. Of these, 65 took up technical 
professions, in sectors such as Metallurgy and Machine Building, Automobile and Aeronautics, 
Power and Electrical Equipment, Transportation, Chemistry, and Iron and Steel. Of the total elite 
group this was about one third (32.2 percent) . This contrasts with 13 (6 percent) among those 
with lower levels of education who undertook work in those sectors. The proportion of those who 
took occupation in those technical sectors among the college or university educated was 23.3 
percent (47 individuals). From this standpoint, in the English elite, entrepreneurs with secondary 
education seem to be the most technologically inclined, and those with higher studies a little less, 
while those with no or only elementary education seem to belong to a different population with 
much lower technical propensities or abilities. The same seems to obtain in Banking, Commerce 
and Tourism. Banking seems to have attracted the educated much more, whereas Commerce and 
Tourism seem clearly the domain of the less educated.  
To what extent did university education make a difference in England? Not much when 
compared with secondary education. The university- educated seem to have been more 
specialized in Automobile and Aeronautics, Banking, Iron and Steel and Chemistry than the 
other groups and clearly less in Food. In Automobile and Aeronautics and in Banking the more 
education the more participation seems to have been the rule. But, to repeat, among English elite 
entrepreneurs the great divide seems to have been between those with only primary education (or 
less) and the others. 
Among the Spanish elite the cleavage is between the university-educated and the rest, 
because there was no middle ground. 
To reiterate once more, these impressionistic but stubbornly consistent conclusions seem 
quite commonsensical and self-evident but, as we have seen, are far from being widely shared. 
Elite entrepreneurs both in England and in Spain had higher levels of education that the average. 
In addition versatility and the choice of more technically sophisticated sectors also seem to be a 
function of the level of studies and of the fields of study. The main difference between the two 
countries was that secondary education was much more effective in England that in Spain, so 
many successful entrepreneurs in England just completed this level of education. 
One possible objection which could be posed to our finding that successful entrepreneurs 
have a higher educational standard than the average (or than those less prominent or successful) 
is that the relation may be just the inverse, i.e., the causation might not run from studies to 
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performance, but rather in the other direction; or, al least, that there might be a reciprocal 
causation. The possibility exists that those entrepreneurs who have higher-level studies may often 
belong to prosperous families and, therefore, they may owe both their success and their high-
level studies to a third factor: family income or status. 
In order to contrast this alternative hypothesis we have analyzed our “Self” sample to see 
whether the level of studies was significantly different from the rest. Since the self-made 
entrepreneurs do not owe their success to their families’ wealth, in this case the role of family 
income as independent or causal variable should be excluded. Even if their higher-level studies 
were due to their family income, their entrepreneurial success would not be; education would 
remain the main independent variable. Therefore, if family income or status were determinant, 
the level of studies of the “Not-self-made” should be significantly lower. 
Tables C.5.1 and C.5.2. show the relative level of university studies of Spanish and 
English entrepreneurs by groups and percentages. “All” refers to the wider sample, “Elite” to the 
elite samples. In the first row, first column, 32.6 means that 32.6 percent of all Spanish self-made 
entrepreneurs in the wider sample had only primary studies or we do not know. The 
corresponding figure for English entrepreneurs is 24.7 percent. And so on. The Spanish figures in 
the even rows are in general higher because we know their levels of study were more polarized. 
Either they had only primary-level studies or less, or they went to the university. If the elite self-
made Spaniards had a low figure for “No studies” this was because they had a very high 
proportion of university degrees. The clear exception in the English case was that of the 
“Managers” (we have no similar category for Spain), whose educational level was much higher 
for reasons we discussed before. All in all it does not seem that self-made entrepreneurs had a 
significantly higher educational level than the others, either in England or in Spain. On the 
contrary, in the wider sample both in England and in Spain self-made entrepreneurs were below 
in educational level, but the differences were small: 5.1 percentage points in England, 0.6 in 
Spain.  
In the Spanish elite sample the situation was reversed by wider margin: 12.3 percentage 
points. This means that it was among the more successful entrepreneurs that education made 
some difference: those self-made were the better educated and this could be interpreted as 
meaning that family income played some role. Nevertheless, as we will see, Chi-square tests 
show the difference not to be significant. 
In the English elite samples the results are contradictory: in the nineteenth century elite 
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group the self-made had lower university levels; the reverse is true for the twentieth-century elite. 
In order to gain some precision we ran some Chi-square tests and they show that in the 
Spanish case the differences in levels of studies and also in fields of study between “Self-made” 
and the others were not significant at the 1 percent level, both for university studies and for the 
other group, i.e., those with primary and secondary education. The results for the English sample, 
with the same degree of significance, were similar, with one exception. Among those who had no 
university education, the “Self-made” had followed apprenticeship studies in a relevant number, 
while the in other group those who attended public schools made a considerable subset. This was 
the only significant difference between “Self-made” and the others, and this only for England. 
 
B) Econometric analysis  
 
 B.1) The Logit Models 
 
We start with the analysis of a variable that would express a degree of entrepreneurial 
success. According to the definitions of entrepreneurship which we cited before, economic 
versatility (or adaptability) could be considered as one of the essential qualities of 
entrepreneurship. We assume that the more versatile an entrepreneur is, the more successful, or, 
at least, the better prepared he is to be successful. 
After a series of failed trials with linear regression, we decided to try the logit method, 
since most of our variables are of the discrete nature to which logit is best adapted.  
Our dependent variable, therefore, will be the number of sectors in which our subjects 
had been active. It has been made discrete by considering that the entrepreneur was versatile if 
he operated in more that one sector, and not versatile if he operated in only one sector. 
Our independent variables are: 
Birth = Year of birth; this is the only continuous (non discrete) variable. 
Appr = Apprenticeship 
ArtAppr= Articled Apprenticeship 
EconLaw= Economics and/or Law 
SciArch= Sciences and/or Architecture 
VarUnf= Various fields or unfinished university studies 
Public = Public School 
Sec= Secondary school 
NoUnk = Only primary studies, no studies or unknown (option of reference) 
S = Self-made 
NS= Nearly Self-made 
NH= Nearly Heir 
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H = Inherited an ongoing business (option of reference). 
 
All these variables have been more fully discussed above. The only not discussed is year 
of birth. We have included this variable because we wanted to know whether as time passed 
entrepreneurs became more or less versatile. There are reasons in favor of one and the other 
possibility. They could become more versatile as their years and the quality of schooling 
lengthened and improved. They could become less so as economic complexity increased and 
specialization became more necessary for a good performance. An example will suffice: we 
found that in England carpenters or cabinetmakers often ended up designing airplanes, as did 
automobile engineers. The somewhat surprising role of carpenters in the early years of aviation 
was due to the fact that the first fuselages were made of wood. As materials and design improved, 
however, only aeronautical engineers designed airplanes. In this case, the correlation would be 
negative. 
Our model then would be as follows: 
 
Prob (Y=1) =  Prob (versatile entrepr = 1) =      
 
 
      exp (∃0+∃1Nac+∃2Ingl+∃3ApprMed+∃4Publ+ … +∃7Heir+∃8Self) 
=  _________________________________________________________ 
   1+ exp (∃0+∃1Nac+∃2Ingl+∃3ApprMed+∃4Publ+ … +∃7Heir+∃8Self) 
 
 
Where “exp” is the exponential number (i.e., “e”) 
 
Our initial sample is a set of 1181 English entrepreneurs; from the original 1712 from  
 
which we have eliminated those who could be categorized as “managers”. 
 





       Parameter        Estimate               Standard      t-ratios 
                                                             Errors 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     Constan            t -1.5988710         4.7388093           -0.33739930  
      Birth             3.5047717e-005      0.0025604750     0.013687975  
     Appr                 -0.27342438        0.22587257        -1.2105249  
     ArtAppr           -0.28107408        0.24878060        -1.1298071  
     EconLaw *      0.57453743        0.32603793          1.7621797  
     SciArch           0.37520838        0.25064518          1.4969702  
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     VarUnf            0.13321616        0.24940815          0.53412913  
      Public ***      0.96588428        0.30720860          3.1440665  
       Sec                -0.010434710        0.24656959       -0.042319534  
      (NoUnk)    option of reference 
        NS ***         1.2502198        0.29493717             4.2389360  
        NH ***         0.65088357        0.23935620           2.7193095  
        S                   0.27027580        0.17915978           1.5085741  
       (H)               option of reference 
 
 Levels of significance: * 10%;   ** 5%;   *** 1% (applicable throughout the paper) 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
MEASURES OF FIT: 
  Likelihood Ratio Chi-square:                41.8713  
    with 11  d.f., prob=0.000  
  -2 Log Likelihood for full model:         1261.0690  
  -2 Log likelihood for restricted model:   1302.9403  




The most significant educational variables are Public (significant at 1% level) and 
EconLaw (at 10%). They tell us that the most versatile entrepreneurs were those who had 
attended public school and, with a smaller probability, those who had studied economics or law. 
Further tests will show that the Public variable is quite robust (so much so that we can only 
subscribe Berghoff’s conclusion, that “the hypothesis of the negative influence of public schools 
on late nineteenth- century economic growth must be rejected in toto”: Berghoff (1990), p. 166), 
while EconLaw is considerably less so. As to what we have called entrepreneurial self 
sufficiency, our results show that moderately self-sufficient entrepreneurs (NS and NH) were 
more versatile than self-made or heirs. These results are quite logical. By our definition heirs 
tended to stick to the business and the sector they inherited; self-made probably also stuck to the 
business they built and therefore tended to stay in that same sector.  
Although not significant, it is interesting to note that three variables have negative values: 
Appr, ArtAppr, and Sec. We interpret this as a strong indication that college- or university- 
level studies contributed to entrepreneurial versatility, something that is suggested by the positive 
sign of SciArch and VarUnf, in addition to EconLaw. This will be confirmed in further tests. 
The apprenticeship variables, however, have positive signs and become significant in other, more 
refined tests as we will see. The Birth variable appears to be minuscule and not significant, but 
this will also change somewhat in further tests. 
 




A first refinement of our analysis will be to introduce multinomial logit in order to be 
able to distinguish between “moderately versatile” (active in 2 sectors) and “highly versatile” 




Parameter      Estimate         Standard            t-ratios 
                                 Errors 
Option “2 sectors” vs “1 sector” 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           Const        -2.8545013         5.2154941          -0.54731178  
           Birth     0.00060670174      0.0028176255        0.21532377  
           Appr         -0.11874345        0.24109394        -0.49251941  
           ArtAppr    -0.38215011         0.28554292        -1.3383281  
           EconLaw*  0.64065550        0.34907739         1.8352821  
           SciArch       0.20592752        0.28699962        0.71751844  
           VarUnf        0.17571579        0.27091305        0.64860588  
           Public***    0.89770483        0.33602778         2.6715197  
           Sec              0.0039628607      0.27119691       0.014612484  
         NoUnk : reference           
           NS ***    1.0759166          0.32504409         3.3100636  
          NH **      0.59871671        0.25940679         2.3080225  
            S             0.19135534        0.19492196        0.98170230  
            H : reference 
 
option “3 or more sectors” vs “1 sector” 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           Const        0.22770436         8.9080080           0.025561760  
           Birth      -0.0018858109      0.0048161196      -0.39156231  
           Appr*      -1.0749997           0.56650082          -1.8976137  
           ArtAppr   -0.0094928665    0.43133385         -0.022008165  
           EconLaw    0.28970883        0.66288880        0.43703985  
           SciArch**  0.81821008        0.41545561         1.9694284  
           VarUnf      -0.040910759      0.50346451       -0.081258476  
           Public**     1.1912513         0.51250057         2.3243902  
           media        -0.060878961        0.47095211       -0.12926784  
          NoUnk : reference 
          NS***            1.8157885        0.49406380         3.6752106  
          NH*               0.86631934        0.47475095         1.8247869  
           S               0.57822555        0.37019224         1.5619602  
           H : reference 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
MEASURES OF FIT: 
  -2 Log Likelihood for full model:        1555.9754  
  -2 Log likelihood for restricted model:  1608.4739  
  Percent Correctly Predicted:               76.1219 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Here again in both cases Public has high values and significance: public school graduates 
were among the moderately and the highly versatile. The relative novelty is that while economics 
or law graduates were moderately versatile, scientists and architects emerge now as highly 
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versatile with a strong coefficient and good significance (5 %). For the rest, the comments about 
the straight logit model seem valid here. 
As a final consideration, the predictive value of our model seems more than acceptable 
with better than three quarters of the cases correctly predicted in both simple and multinomial 
models. 
 
                                                         oOo 
 
A remark that we received when we read earlier versions of this paper in other forums 
was about the meaning of versatility as measured by number of sectors of activity. This might 
even indicate failure rather than success, we were told, since it could be that a businessman 
failing in a sector would move to a different one in hopes of better luck. This could be a sort of 
“forward escape” phenomenon (what the French call fuite en avant). We know this to be a rather 
infrequent case among the individuals in our sample, but we could only agree that just “number 
of sectors” seems too crude a measure, especially if not complemented with a different type of 
measure or variable. We then decided to make use of our elite groups or sub-samples. We 
already had a ready made elite sample of Spanish entrepreneurs in the Torres Villanueva book of 
the one hundred entrepreneurs of the twentieth century. We gathered two similar samples of 
around one hundred English businessmen, one of the nineteenth and another of the twentieth 
century (see p. 5 above). This would facilitate comparison; although the Spanish group belonged 
to the twentieth century only, since the English economy was far more advanced, comparison 
with nineteenth-century Englishmen seemed to us perfectly legitimate and justified.  
 The building of these samples not only permits comparison; it also provides us with a 
second variable indicating entrepreneurial success and very amenable to the logit model. 
Inclusion in our elite samples would be an alternative variable indicating success. 
Our next test would, therefore, use inclusion in our two English elite samples (a total of 
202 individuals) as dependent variable; the large sample would be that of 1181 entrepreneurs. 




         Parameter    Estimate         Standard               t-ratios 
                                   Errors 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           Const***    82.747151         9.4011006           8.8018578  
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           Birth***    -0.046419344      0.0051456287    -9.0211219  
           Appr **      0.66438734        0.31639091         2.0998939  
           ArtAppr      0.25369633        0.40187655        0.63127925  
           EconLaw   -0.60990338        1.0623570         -0.57410396  
           SciArch**  1.0955430          0.45210343          2.4232132  
           VarUnf *    0.79620120        0.42208246         1.8863641  
           Public **    1.1963696        0.53040476           2.2555785  
           Sec             0.56778958        0.40009453         1.4191386  
           NoUnk : reference 
           NS           0.25919766        0.51202455        0.50622115  
           NH          0.13679747        0.37648887        0.36335064  
            S             0.089347366        0.27853741       0.32077330 
            H : reference  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 MEASURES OF FIT: 
  Likelihood Ratio Chi-square:               119.8564  
    with 11  d.f., prob=0.000  
  -2 Log Likelihood for full model:          565.2159  
  -2 Log likelihood for restricted model:    685.0723  
  Percent Correctly Predicted:                   91.6173 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Although again our educational variables seem to have considerable importance upon the 
success of English entrepreneurs, there are some notable changes in this new regression. For one 
thing, the fit is much better than in the “versatility” tests: almost 92 percent of the predictions are 
correct. For another thing, Birth turns out to be highly significant now, although it also has a 
negative sign and a low coefficient. This would seem to indicate that English entrepreneurs were 
a little less successful in more recent times, something that we find difficult to interpret. ¿May 
this mean that the age of the grandest English entrepreneurs was the heroic nineteenth century? 
Perhaps the main novelties, however, are the solid coefficient and high significance of Appr and 
the negative sign and lack of significance of EconLaw. These are novel but not too surprising. 
Apprenticeship has a strong tradition in England and a crucial role in the formation of 
entrepreneurs, who may not be very versatile, but often became highly successful in their fields 
of specialization. As to graduates in economics and law, their case seems to be the reverse: 
versatile, but not as well-rounded in their role of businessmen. Public again has a strong and 
highly significant coefficient and the same is the case of scientists and architects. Another group 
of university- and college-educated businessmen, including those who did not obtain a degree 
(VarUnf), has a respectable positive coefficient which is significant at the 10 % level. By 
contrast, the various degrees of self-sufficiency seem to have no appreciable effect upon 
entrepreneurial success. All in all, this model seems to confirm quite categorically that university 
and college training is a powerful lever to entrepreneurial success according to the two 
definitions of it we have used: versatility and overall distinction. 
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                                                                                oOo 
 
Our next step in the utilization of our elite samples will be to compare English and 
Spanish entrepreneurs. We return to our versatility model: dependent variable is again number of 
sectors per businessman and the independent variables are the usual except for four variations: 
one, Public has been eliminated because, as we know, public schools do not exist in Spain; two, 
for the same reason VarUnf has also been eliminated: Spanish universities have traditionally 
been very rigid and not permitted multidisciplinary degrees; three, articled and non-articled 
apprenticeships have been aggregated because there are no articled apprenticeships in Spain. The 
aggregate variable now is called ApprT. As result of these changes our English sample is 
reduced to 189 individuals (those who did not attend public school or went on to college); the 
Spanish sample is composed on 101 individuals; total sample size, therefore, is 290. The fourth 
variation is that we have added the variable Engl which denotes whether the entrepreneur was 
English or Spanish.  
It is worth mentioning that since here we are dealing with elite entrepreneurs the 
“forward escape” phenomenon which could affect versatility as a positive entrepreneurial trait 
could be totally discarded. 




       Parameter    Estimate           Standard           t-ratios 
                                       Errors 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          Const         5.1982335          8.5192048          0.61017825  
           Engl         -0.29682249        0.31930839        -0.92957937  
           Birth         -0.0032788158      0.0045265879            -0.72434600  
           ApprT **  -0.77288163        0.36311170                 -2.1284955  
           EconLaw      0.62676281      0.40258646         1.5568403  
           SciArch *     0.72456247      0.37739344         1.9199127  
           Sec              0.39608676        0.45555058        0.86946822  
           NoUnk: reference  
          NS ***         1.6287862        0.48842168         3.3347951  
           NH **         1.0409395        0.43195624         2.4098262  
            S *              0.59493965      0.32187621         1.8483492  
           H: reference 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
MEASURES OF FIT: 
  Likelihood Ratio Chi-square:                32.5662  
    with 9  d.f., prob=0.000  
  -2 Log Likelihood for full model:          358.5771  
  -2 Log likelihood for restricted model:    391.1433  






Our first finding is that the Engl variable is neither high nor significant, which 
undoubtedly means that the differences between English and Spanish entrepreneurs regarding 
versatility are not very important. Its sign is negative, though, which accords with our finding 
through descriptive analysis that English entrepreneurs were less versatile than Spanish. Birth is 
even lower and less significant, and also negative. The Appr coefficient is high and significant at 
the 5 % level. It is also negative. This agrees with our earlier findings that businessmen who 
went through apprenticeship tended to stick to their specialty and were not very versatile, 
although this did not prevent them from achieving distinction. SciArch has a positive sign and is 
significant at the 10 % level. EconLaw, although lower and non significant, has a positive sign. 
It compares well with Sec, confirming our impression that college education favors versatility. 
As to the degrees of entrepreneurial self sufficiency, it seems again that heirs were the least 
versatile, followed by self-made. This is also consistent with our previous findings. 
The model, however, has lost predictive power relative to our earlier “versatility models” 
(Tables 1 and 2), no doubt due to diminished homogeneity when mixing English and Spanish 
businessmen. 
 
B.2) Censored-variable (Tobit) Models 
 
We have tried to introduce a further refinement in our analysis by giving weights to our 
sectors according to technological content and strength of demand criteria. Our weights have 
been obtained from Spanish sources [Segura (1989)] which make use of data from Eurostat, 
OECD, and other official agencies; the weights are available in Appendix B, Table B.3. Our aim 
is obvious: we consider that by operating in sectors with a higher degree of technological 
sophistication and of higher demand businessmen make a more positive contribution to economic 
development than by staying in sectors that are less innovative technologically or whose demand 
grows less.  
Of course our variables are censored because our weights cannot be zero and therefore 
our weighted variables can never reach values below a certain positive minimum.  
Our first run refers to the “technological content” (or depth) of our sectors, and is based 






Parameters     Estimates      Std. err.  Est./s.e.    Prob.     Gradient 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Const                 0.8429         2.7994     0.301    0.3817       0.0007 
Birth                  -0.0001         0.0015    -0.045    0.4821      -0.1198 
Appr                  -0.0317         0.1275    -0.249    0.4017      -0.0000 
ArtAppr **        0.2694         0.1393     1.933    0.0266      -0.0004 
EconLaw           0.1171         0.2110     0.555    0.2895      -0.0001 
SciArch ***       0.9975         0.1543    6.463    0.0000      -0.0003 
VarUnf              0.0418         0.1485     0.282    0.3891       0.0001 
Public **            0.4104        0.2019     2.033    0.0210      -0.0001 
Sec                     0.1091         0.1455     0.750    0.2266       0.0001 
NoUnk : reference 
NS *                   0.3400         0.1929     1.763    0.0390       0.0005 
NH                     0.1465         0.1460     1.004    0.1578      -0.0004 





The conclusions are not surprising. There is one novelty, though: when we take into 
account the technological content of sectors, articled apprenticeship (ArtAppr) becomes, for the 
first time, positive and significant at the 95% level. This seems natural (articled apprenticeships 
are very akin to engineering or professional studies) and increases the confidence we have in the 
consistence of our database. Straight apprenticeship, in exchange, is small, negative, and not 
significant. The other strong and significant educational variables are SciArch (significant at the 
99% level) and Public (at the 95% level). 
Regarding degree of entrepreneurial self-sufficiency the results are also quite easy to 
explain: while not very high, S is positive and significant at the 95% level and NS a little higher 
and significant at the 90% level. This means that self-made and nearly self-made are the types of 
entrepreneurs who were active in technologically innovative sectors, while those who inherited 
their businesses were less innovative: another logical outcome. Again, these results justify our 
confidence in the quality of our data. 
 
Our last run refers to adaptability to changes in demand: here the sectors have been 
weighted according to their being considered of strong, medium, or weak demand and weighted 
accordingly (0.3, 0.2, and 0.1 respectively). The sample is the same as before and the results are 





Parameters     Estimates      Std. err.   Est./s.e.   Prob.     Gradient 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Const **         0.9644         0.3835     2.515    0.0060      -0.0144 
Birth **         -0.0005        0.0002    -2.281   0.0113     -33.0950 
Appr *              0.0309         0.0176     1.759    0.0393       0.0595 
ArtAppr           0.0286        0.0195     1.465    0.0714        0.0699 
EconLaw ***   0.1159         0.0287     4.045    0.0000       0.0418 
SciArch ***     0.1570         0.0211     7.443    0.0000       0.0170 
VarUnf            0.0052         0.0205     0.256    0.3989      -0.1563 
Public ***       0.0935         0.0276     3.391    0.0003       0.0092 
Sec                  0.0429         0.0202     2.128    0.0167       0.0558 
NoUnk: reference  
NS ***            0.0968         0.0260     3.726    0.0001       0.0021 
NH **              0.0448         0.0199     2.250    0.0122       0.0434 





The results here again tend to confirm our hypotheses. The highest and most significant 
variables are those related with college or university training, SciArch and EconLaw, closely 
followed by Public, with Appr a very distant fourth both in terms of significance and of value of 
coefficient. We find extremely interesting that economists and lawyers, while not very strong on 
technology, according to the previous Table, seem much more able to adapt to changes in 
demand.  For the second time we find a table where Birth has high significance and a negative 
sign. Our interpretation here is that, as time went on and the technological level increased, 
versatility, shifting from one sector to another, became more difficult. Our example of carpenters 
in aeronautics would apply here. 
Regarding self-sufficiency, we find that NS, NH, and S, in this order, were able to adapt 
to changes in demand in different degrees. Unsurprisingly, the less amenable to adapt to demand 
change appear to be the heirs, stuck as they were to the businesses and sectors they inherited. 
 
Final considerations 
Our results are far from conclusive. It is our immediate purpose to enlarge our Spanish 
sample so as to make it more homogeneous and thereby facilitate further comparison with the 
English sample. However, it is encouraging that the data gathered and processed so far seem to 
confirm our rather simple and commonsensical hypotheses that education has a beneficial 
influence upon entrepreneurial activity, and that college and university education (with the 
addition of public schools) improve the versatility and overall performance of entrepreneurs. In 
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other words, that nurture is an important part of entrepreneurship. Nature can be improved upon. 
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APPENDIX A:  ELITE ENGLISH ENTREPRENEURS 
 
ELITE ENGLISH ENTREPRENEURS Century ELITE ENGLISH ENTREPRENEURS Century 
Aitken, William Maxwell-1st Lord Beaverbrook 20th D'Arcy, William, Knox 19th  
Arsmtrong, William George 19th  De Ferranti, Sebastian Ziani 20th 
Austin, Herbert 20th De Havilland, Sir Geoffrey 20th 
Bagnall, John Nock 19th  Deloitte, William Welch 19th  
Baldwin, Alfred 19th  Doulton, Sir Henry 19th  
Barford, Edward James 20th Ellerman, Sir John Reeves    20th 
Barham, Sir George 19th  Ellis, John Devonshire 19th  
Baring, John 20th Ferguson, Henry George 20th 
Barlow, Sir Robert 20th Firth, Mark 19th  
Baron, Bernhard 20th Foley, Patrick James 19th  
Barratt, Arthur William 20th Foster, William 19th  
Bartlett, Sir Charles John 20th Fry, Joseph Storrs 19th  
Bartlett, Sir Herbert Henry 19th  Furness, Christopher-1st Lord Furness of Grantley 19th  
Beatty, Sir Alfred Chester 20th Gamble, Sir David 19th  
Beecham, Sir Joseph 19th  Gestetner, David 20th 
Beecham, Thomas 19th  Gibbs, Henry Hucks-1st Lord Aldenham 19th  
Beit, Alfred 19th  Goldie-Taubman, Sir George Daswood 19th  
Bell, Sir Isaac Lowthian 19th  Gollancz, Sir Victor 20th 
Belling, Charles Reginald 20th Gossage, William 19th  
Bellman, Sir Charles Harold 20th Grenfell, Arthur Morton 20th 
Benn, Sir Ernest John Pickstone 20th Guinness, Edward Cecil-1st Earl of Iveagh 20th 
Berry, James Gomer, 1st Viscount Kemsley 20th Hadfield, Sir Robert Abbott 20th 
Bessemer, Sir Henry 19th  Hambro, Sir Everard Alexander 19th  
Blackwell, Richard 20th Harland, Sir Edward James 19th  
Bolckow, Henry William Ferdinand 19th  
Harmsworth, Alfred Charles William-1st Viscount of St. Peter in 
the County of Kent 20th 
Bolitho, Tomas Bedford 19th  Harmsworth, Harold Sidney-1st Viscount Rothermere of Hemsted 20th 
Bolton, Sir George Lewis French 20th Haslam, Sir Alfred Seale 20th 
Boot, Jesse, 1st Lord Trent of Nothingham 20th Hattersley, Richard Longden 19th  
Bowater, Sir Eric (Frederick) Vansittart 20th Heath II, Robert 19th  
Broadhurst, Sir Edward Tootal 19th  Heath, Cuthbert Eden 20th 
Brookes, Raymond Percival 20th Hewlett, Alfred 19th  
Brown, Sir John 19th  Hickman, Sir Alfred 19th  
Browne, Sir Benjamin Chapman 19th  Hingley, Sir Benjamin 19th  
Brunner, Sir John Tomlinson 19th  Hirst, Hugo-1st Lord Hirst of Witton 20th 
Bryant, Wilberforce 19th  Holden, Sir Edward Hopkinson 19th  
Burton, Sir Montague Maurice 20th Hollins, Sir Frank 19th  
Butlin, Sir William Heygate Edmund Colbourne 20th Houldsworth, Sir William Henry 19th  
Cadbury, George 19th  Hulton, Sir Edward 19th  
Cadbury, Laurence John 20th Illingworth, Alfred 19th  
Cadman, John-1st Lord Cardman of Silverdale 20th Inman, William 19th  
Cassel, Sir Ernest Joseph 20th Isaacs, Godfrey Charles 19th  
Cavendish, William, 7th Duke of Devonshire 19th  Ismay, Thomas Henry 19th  
Chadwick, David 19th  Jephcott, Sir Harry 20th 
Chamberlain, Arthur 19th  Johnson, Claude Goodman 20th 
Chamberlain, Joseph 19th  Johnston, John Lawson 19th  
Chancellor, Sir Christopher John Howard 20th Joseph, Sir Maxwell 20th 
Clark, Alfred Corning 20th Keen, Arthur 19th  
Cockshut, John 19th  Korda, Sir Alexander 20th 
Cohen, Sir John Edward 20th Lane, Sir Allen 20th 
Collins, Douglas Raymond 20th Lawson, Edward Lewy-1st Lord Burnham of Hall Barn 19th  
Colman, Jeremiah James 19th  Lee, Henry 19th  
Colston, Sir Charles Blampied 20th Lee, Sir Joseph Cocksey 19th  
Combe, Simon Harvey 20th 
Lever, William Hesketh-1st Viscount Leverhulme of the Western 
Isles 20th 
Cook, John Mason 19th  Lewis, John Spedan 20th 
Cook, Thomas 19th  Lewis, William Thomas-1st Lord Merthyr of Senghenydd 19th  
Courtauld III, Samuel 19th  Liberty, Sir Arthur Lasenby 19th  
Courtauld, IV, Samuel 20th Lipton, Sir Thomas Johnstone 20th 
Crossley, Francis William 19th  Llewellyn, Sir David Richard 20th 
Crossley, Sir William John 19th  Longman, Charles James 19th  
Crowther, Geoffrey 20th Lyle, Charles Ernest Leonard-1st Lord Lyle of Westbourne 20th 
Currie, Sir Donald 19th  Lyons, Sir William 20th 
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Dalziel, Davison Alexander-Lord Dalziel of Wooler 20th Lysaght, John 19th  
ELITE ENGLISH ENTREPRENEURS Century ELITE ENGLISH ENTREPRENEURS Century 
Mackintosh, Harold Vincent-1st Viscount Mackintosh 
of Halifax 20th Sieff, Israel Moses-Lord Sieff of Brimpton 20th 
Mackintosh, John 19th  Siemens, Sir Charles William 19th  
Manfield, Sir Moses Philip 19th  Simon, Ernest Emil Darwin-1st Lord Simon of Wythenshawe 20th 
Marks, Michael 19th  Simon, Henry 19th  
Marks, Simon-1st Lord Marks of Broughton 20th Simpson, Samuel Leonard 20th 
Matheson, Hugh Mackay 19th  Sopwith, Sir Thomas Octave Murdoch 20th 
Mitchell, Sir Godfrey Way 20th Spurrier, Sir Henry 20th 
Mond, Alfred Moritz-1st Lord Melchett of Landford 20th Stamp, Josiah Charles-1st Lord Stamp of Shortlands 20th 
Mond, Ludwig 19th  Stevens, Marshall 20th 
Morris, William 20th Steward-Liberty, Arthur Ivor 20th 
Morrison, Charles 19th  Stokes, Donald Gresham-Lord Stokes of Leyland, Lancashire 20th 
Mountain, Sir Edward Mortimer 20th Stoll, Sir Oswald 20th 
Newness, Sir George 19th  Swan, Sir Joseph Wilson 19th  
Nixon, John 19th  Tate, Sir Henry 19th  
Owen, Sir Alfred George Beech 20th Thomas, Richard 19th  
Parsons, The Honourable Sir Charles Algernon 20th Thomas, Sidney Gilchrist 19th  
Pasold, Sir Eric Walter 20th Thorn, Sir Jules 20th 
Pearson, Weetman Dickinson-1st Viscount Cowdray 20th Thornycroft, Sir Jonh Isaac 19th  
Perkin, Sir William Henry 19th  Touche, Sir George Alexander 20th 
Perkins, Francis Arthur 20th Twining, III Richard 19th  
Philipps, John Wynord-1st Viscount St Davids of 
Lydstep Haven 20th Unwin, Sir Stanley 20th 
Philipps, Owen Cosby-Lord Kylsant of Carmarthen 20th Van den Bergh, Henry 20th 
Pilkington, William Henry-1st Lord Pilkington of St 
Helens 20th Vestey, William-1st Lord Vestey of Kingswood 20th 
Pirrie, William James-Viscount Pirrie 19th  Vickers, Albert 20th 
Rank, Joseph Arthur-Lord Rank of Sutton Scotney 20th Vickers, Thomas Edward 19th  
Ransome, James Edward 19th  Ward, William Humble Eric-3rd Earl of Dudley  20th 
Reuter, Paul Julius-1st Baron de Reuter 19th  Waterhouse, Edwin 19th  
Richardson, John Wigham 19th  Wedgwood, Josiah 20th 
Rolls, The Honourable Charles Steward 19th  Weir, William Douglas-1st Viscount Weir of Eastwood 20th 
Rootes, William Edward-1st Lord Rootes of Ramsbury 20th Wellcome, Sir Henry Solomon 20th 
Rothschild, Nathan Meyer-1st Lord Rothschild of 
Tring, Hertfordshire 19th  Wernher, Sir Julius Carl 19th  
Rowntree, Joseph 20th Weston, William Garfield 20th 
Royce, Sir Frederick Henry 20th Whitbread, Francis Pelham 20th 
Rylands, John 19th  White, Sir George 19th  
Sainsbury, John James 20th Whitworth, Sir Joseph 19th  
Salt, Sir Titus 19th  Williams, Sir George 19th  
Samuel, Marcus-1st Viscount Bearsted 20th Wills, William Henry-Lord Winterstoke of Blagdon 19th  
Selfridge, Harry Gordon 20th 
Wilson, Charles Henry-1st Lord Nunburnholme of the City of 
Kingston-upon-Hull 19th  
Siddeley, Jonh Davenport-1st Lord Kenilworth 20th Wyatt, Sir Myles Dermot Norris 20th 
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APPENDIX B: NOTES  
 
TABLE B.1. EXPLANATIONS TO CATEGORIES OF STUDIES 
 
No studies No studies or only elementary  (less than14 years) 
Unknown  
Apprenticeship  
Articled Apprenticeship Lawyer/Barrister, Patent Agent, Articled Architecture, Auditor, Accountant, Electrician, Textile Engineering, Pharmacist, Treasury Department Official, 
Engineering in various fields (mechanics, electricity, mining, chemistry, naval, railroad), seaman, topographer, professional training in qualified 
institutions (Birmingham College of Technology, University College School, Belfast College of Technology, Royal Tecnhical College of Glasgow, etc) 
Secondary Studies  Ordinarily until 17 years 
Public School Charterhouse, Cheltenham, Clifton, Eton, Haileybury, Harrow, Malvern, Marlborough, Radley, Repton, Rossall, Rugby, St Paul's School, Sherborne, 
Uppingham, Westminster y Winchester; Bedford, Bradfield, Dulwich, Fettes, Glenalmond, Loretto, Merchant Taylor's School, Oakham, Oundle, 




Sciences Biochemistry, Botany, Science, Applied Science, Mechanical Science, Pharmacy, Physics-Chemistry and Physiology, Geology, Mathematics, Medicine, 
Chemistry, Metallurgical Chemistry, Veterinary Science, Electricity-Physics-Mathematics, Mathematical-Physics, Mining Engineering-Geology, 
Engineering-Mathematical-Physics 
Various Fields,  
Multidisciplinary, Unspecified 
College and University Studies 
Unspecified, Science/Law, Classics/Law, Law/Mathematics, Economics/History/Law, Economics/Engineering, Economics/Law, Philosophy/Economics, 
Philosophy/Law, Physics/Law, Modern History/Law, Engineering/Economics, Literature/Science 
Unfinished College or 
University Studies 
 
Miscellany Academy, Military Science and Engineering, Moral Science, Classics, Ecclesiastical Studies, History, Modern History, History/Auditing, Philology, 




TABLE B.2. EXPLANATIONS TO SECTORS 
 
Food and Agriculture Agriculture and manufacturing of food, drink and tobacco  
Automobile-Aeronautics 
Design and Manufacture of bicycles, motorcycles, cars, aeroplanes, aircrafts and specific parts thereof (engines, motors, turbines, clutches, 
tyres etc.) and their workshops 
Banking Banking, stockdealing, finance 
Commerce Import-export, commerce and trade, wholesale and retail 
Communication 
Actors, agents and impresarios, advertising agents, cinema (including distribution) and stage theaters, publishing, dailies, weeklies and 
magazines, photography, printing, musical industry 
Building-Real estate 
Building, Real estate agency, production and manufacturing of primary and intermediary building materials (concrete, quarries, pipes, floors, 
ceilings, tiles, bricks, window glass, wallpaper); wood processing; architectural design, contractors and projectors, including public works 
Consumption 
Ceramics, stamp collecting, silverware, fashion, furniture, house appliances, matches, needles, office and business machines and wares, 
scientific and medical instruments, optical and photographic instruments, drafting, drawing and designing instruments, mathematical and 
measurement instruments, including watches and calculators, musical instruments, porcelain, china, glass, bathroom fittings, lamps, toys, ink, 
art dealers, surgical bandages, paper napkins,  sanitary towels  
Power Electricity, gas, petroleum, agrícultural engines, nuclear power, petrochemicals and personnel working in these sectors 
Electrical equipment Electrical and electronic parts, cables, turbines, computers and related instruments 
Metallurgy and machine building 
Shipbuilding, shipyards, armament and weapons industry, machinery (including agricultural), hardware, engineering equipment, metallurgy 
of diverse metals (lead, tin, nickel, precious metals, etc.), nuts and bolts, railroad parts and material, turbine parts, fire repellents, furnaces, 
ovens, and mills 
Mining   
Chemicals 
In addition to Basic chemicals it includes soap and soda, pharmaceuticals, drugs, paint, perfumes, fertilizers, alkaloids, plastics, synthetic 
dyes, etc. and paper 
Insurance   
Services Legal work, auditing, accounting, consulting, counseling, tourism, funeral services 
Iron and steel Iron and steel manufacturing and closely related activities 
Textiles Manufacturing of textiles, clothing, footwear, and leatherwork 
Transportation Railroad, shipping, airlines, road transportation 
Various 
Directors, executives, managers, officers, foremen (of private and public companies), speculators, business promotors, union officials, 
exhibition organizers, college professors, , cooperative organizers, heirs of great fortunes, ocial philosophers, leaders of business 
associations, politicians, business organizers, inventors  









 Strength of demand Tecnological depth 





Building-Real estate Weak 0,4
Consumption Strong 2
Power Strong 0,2
Electrical equipment Strong 3,5









Source: Segura, et al. (1989), based upon EUROSTAT, OCDE and other official sources. 
NOTE: The classification of Banking, Commerce, Communication, Insurance, Transportation and Various has been made 





APPENDIX C: TABLES 
 
TABLE C.1.1. EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF SPANISH ENTREPRENEURS 
 

















(1) No studies  64 22,22 13 12,87 39 34,21 15 14,29 
(2) Unknown  33 11,46 11 10,89 13 11,40 17 16,19 
(3) Apprenticeship  35 12,15 10 9,90 14 12,28 14 13,33 
(4) Articled Apprenticeship              
(5) Secondary Education  6 2,08 2 1,98 3 2,63 1 0,95 
(6) Public School              
(7) Engineer/Architect  47 16,32 23 22,77 6 5,26 23 21,90 
(8) Law  40 13,89 23 22,77 12 10,53 11 10,48 
(9) Economics  31 10,76 10 9,90 14 12,28 10 9,52 
(10) Sciences  13 4,51 3 2,97 6 5,26 6 5,71 
(11) Cross-disciplinary and Unknown University Studies              
(12) Unfinished University Studies  7 2,43 2 1,98 3 2,63 4 3,81 
(13) Miscellany  12 4,17 4 3,96 4 3,51 4 3,81 
(14) TOTAL  288 100 101 100 114 100 105 100 
 
SUMMARY 

















(1) No studies and Unknown  97 33,68 24 23,76 52 45,61 32 30,48 
(2) Apprenticeship and Articled Apprenticeship  35 12,15 10 9,90 14 12,28 14 13,33 
(3) Secondary Education  6 2,08 2 1,98 3 2,63 1 0,95 
(4) Public School     0,00  0,00  0,00 
(5) University Studies  150 52,08 65 64,36 45 39,47 58 55,24 





TABLE C.1.2. EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF ENGLISH ENTREPRENEURS FROM (JI) 
 
 ALL NO MANAGER MANAGER 102 SELECTED 
20th 





















 %  
(1) No studies  169 14,31 149 16,07 20 7,87 12 11,76 14 14,00 
(2) Unknown  93 7,87 82 8,85 11 4,33 4 3,92 5 5,00 
(3) Apprenticeship  201 17,02 184 19,85 17 6,69 14 13,73 26 26,00 
(4) Articled Apprenticeship  154 13,04 94 10,14 60 23,62 10 9,80 11 11,00 
(5) Secondary Education  148 12,53 121 13,05 27 10,63 14 13,73 16 16,00 
(6) Public School  55 4,66 45 4,85 10 3,94 6 5,88 4 4,00 
(7) Engineer/Architect  65 5,50 41 4,42 24 9,45 9 8,82 2 2,00 
(8) Law  30 2,54 13 1,40 17 6,69 2 1,96 1 1,00 
(9) Economics  24 2,03 17 1,83 7 2,76 9 8,82  0,00 
(10) Sciences  53 4,49 41 4,42 12 4,72 4 3,92 7 7,00 
(11) Cross-disciplinary and Unknown University Studies 93 7,87 68 7,34 25 9,84 6 5,88 9 9,00 
(12) Unfinished University Studies  43 3,64 34 3,67 9 3,54 7 6,86 2 2,00 
(13) Miscellany  53 4,49 38 4,10 15 5,91 5 4,90 3 3,00 
(14) TOTAL  1181 100 927 100 254 100 102 100 100 100 
 
SUMMARY 
 ALL NO MANAGER MANAGER 102 SELECTED 
20th 





















 %  
(1) No studies and Unknown  262 22,18 231 24,92 31 12,20 16 15,69 19 19,00 
(2) Apprenticeship and Articled Apprenticeship  355 30,06 278 29,99 77 30,31 24 23,53 37 37 
(3) Secondary Education  148 12,53 121 13,05 27 10,63 14 13,73 16 16,00 
(4) Public School  55 4,66 45 4,85 10 3,94 6 5,88 4 4,00 
(5) University Studies  361 30,57 252 27,18 109 42,91 42 41,18 24 24,00 




TABLE C.1.3. EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF ENGLISH ENTREPRENEURS FROM (JII) 
 
 ALL ONLY NEW   MANAGER NO MANAGER INCLUDED IN 
BOTH BOOKS 


























(1) No studies  57 7,60 32 6,03 26 6,55 31 8,78 25 11,42 201 11,74 
(2) Unknown  54 7,20 46 8,66 31 7,81 23 6,52 8 3,65 139 8,12 
(3) Apprenticeship  61 8,13 32 6,03 26 6,55 35 9,92 29 13,24 233 13,61 
(4) Articled Apprenticeship  73 9,73 41 7,72 43 10,83 30 8,50 32 14,61 195 11,39 
(5) Secondary Education  99 13,20 67 12,62 46 11,59 53 15,01 32 14,61 215 12,56 
(6) Public School  45 6,00 29 5,46 18 4,53 27 7,65 16 7,31 84 4,91 
(7) Engineer/Architect  61 8,13 47 8,85 42 10,58 19 5,38 14 6,39 112 6,54 
(8) Law  40 5,33 33 6,21 23 5,79 17 4,82 7 3,20 63 3,68 
(9) Economics  39 5,20 28 5,27 22 5,54 17 4,82 11 5,02 52 3,04 
(10) Sciences  23 3,07 13 2,45 14 3,53 9 2,55 10 4,57 66 3,86 
(11) Cross-disciplinary and Unknown University Studies 127 16,93 113 21,28 68 17,13 59 16,71 14 6,39 206 12,03 
(12) Unfinished University Studies  17 2,27 7 1,32 6 1,51 11 3,12 10 4,57 50 2,92 
(13) Miscellany  54 7,20 43 8,10 32 8,06 22 6,23 11 5,02 96 5,61 
(14) TOTAL  750 100 531 100 397 100 353 100 219 100 1712 100 
 
SUMMARY 
 ALL ONLY NEW MANAGER NO MANAGER INCLUDED IN 
BOTH BOOKS 


























(1) No studies and Unknown  111 14,80 78 14,69 57 14,36 54 15,30 33 15,07 340 19,86 
(2) Apprenticeship and Articled Apprenticeship  134 17,87 73 13,75 69 17,38 65 18,41 61 27,85 428 25 
(3) Secondary Education  99 13,20 67 12,62 46 11,59 53 15,01 32 14,61 215 12,56 
(4) Public School  45 6,00 29 5,46 18 4,53 27 7,65 16 7,31 84 4,91 
(5) University Studies  361 48,13 284 53,48 207 52,14 154 43,63 77 35,16 645 37,68 
(6) TOTAL  750 100 531 100 397 100 353 100 219 100 1712 100 
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 TABLE C.2.1. DEGREE OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF SPANISH BUSINESSMEN 
 


















(1) SELF  141 48,96 48 47,52 59 51,75 46 43,81 
(2) HEIR  90 31,25 24 23,76 41 35,96 33 31,43 
(3) NHEIR  27 9,38 12 11,88 5 4,39 12 11,43 
(4) NSELF  30 10,42 17 16,83 9 7,89 14 13,33 
(5) TOTAL  288 100 101 100 114 100 105 100 
 
TABLE C.2.2. DEGREE OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF ENGLISH ENTREPRENEURS FROM JI   
 
 ALL NO 
 MANAGER 
MANAGER 102 SELECTED 
20th 





















 %  
(1) SELF  673 56,99 474 51,13 199 78,35 50 49,02 53 53,00 
(2) HEIR  304 25,74 291 31,39 13 5,12 26 25,49 27 27,00 
(3) NHEIR  140 11,85 113 12,19 27 10,63 17 16,67 14 14,00 
(4) NSELF  64 5,42 49 5,29 15 5,91 9 8,82 6 6,00 
(5) TOTAL  1181 100 927 100 254 100 102 100 100 100 
 
TABLE C.2.3. DEGREE OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF ENGLISH ENTREPRENEURS FROM  JII 
 






























 %  
(1) SELF  484 64,53 360 67,80 342 86,15 142 40,23 124 56,62 1033 60,34 
(2) HEIR  179 23,87 129 24,29 21 5,29 158 44,76 50 22,83 433 25,29 
(3) NHEIR  49 6,53 20 3,77 19 4,79 30 8,50 29 13,24 160 9,35 
(4) NSELF  38 5,07 22 4,14 15 3,78 23 6,52 16 7,31 86 5,02 

















































(1) Agriculture & Food  13,60 16,67 12,08 13,97 5,82 9,21 6,34 7,12 6,44 
(2) Automobile & Aeronautics  1,72 1,61 2,42 1,68 7,25 10,53 3,52 6,34 6,39 
(3) Banking  14,18 9,68 12,56 18,44 7,12 6,58 5,63 8,12 7,47 
(4) Commerce  6,13 7,53 6,76 2,23 7,52 7,89 9,86 6,34 7,05 
(5) Communication & Show Business  4,41 4,30 5,31 3,91 6,21 11,84 6,34 6,23 6,34 
(6) Building & Real State  10,34 15,59 5,80 10,61 5,23 4,61 2,11 4,34 5,12 
(7) Consumer Industries  3,07 5,91 0,97 3,35 4,84 6,58 1,41 3,56 4,56 
(8) Power  4,21 1,08 5,80 6,15 4,58 1,97 1,41 4,34 4,37 
(9) Electric Equipment  0,96  1,93 0,56 2,16 1,97 2,11 3,11 2,40 
(10) Metallurgy & Machine Building  5,17 2,69 8,21 5,03 9,48 5,92 14,79 5,67 8,18 
(11) Mining  1,92  0,48 5,03 3,73 1,97 6,34 3,23 3,71 
(12) Chemistry  7,09 4,84 9,66 8,38 4,71 7,89 6,34 4,67 4,46 
(13) Insurance  1,53  1,93 3,35 1,57 1,97 0,70 2,11 1,79 
(14) Services  4,60 7,53 1,93 2,79 3,53 4,61 4,23 2,11 3,15 
(15) Iron & Steel  2,87 1,61 1,93 5,03 4,25 1,97 12,68 4,89 4,32 
(16) Textiles  11,30 12,90 16,43 4,47 6,54 3,29 8,45 5,90 6,30 
(17) Transportation  5,75 7,53 3,86 4,47 10,07 7,89 6,34 12,35 10,86 
(18) Miscellany  1,15 0,54 1,93 0,56 5,42 3,29 1,41 9,57 7,10 


























(1) Agriculture & Food  30 5 3  33 71 
(2) Automobile & Aeronautics  3 1   5 9 
(3) Banking  24 6 2  42 74 
(4) Commerce  12 8 1  11 32 
(5) Communication & Show Business  5 1   17 23 
(6) Building & Real State  17 4   33 54 
(7) Consumer Industries  6 4   6 16 
(8) Power  3 2 1  16 22 
(9) Electric Equipment      5 5 
(10) Metallurgy & Machine Building  7 4 1  15 27 
(11) Mining  2 2   6 10 
(12) Chemistry  5 4   28 37 
(13) Insurance  1    7 8 
(14) Services  9 4   11 24 
(15) Iron & Steel  3    12 15 
(16) Textiles  29 11 2  17 59 
(17) Transportation  10 3   17 30 
(18) Miscellany   1   5 6 
(19) SECTORS  166 60 10  286 522 
(20) ENTREPRENEURS  97 35 6  150 288 
(21) AVERAGE  1,71 1,71 1,67  1,91 1,81 
(22) STANDARD DEVIATION  9,27 2,66 0,75  10,83 21,31 
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(1) Agriculture & Food  20 10 5  3  8 8 7 3  4 3 71 
(2) Automobile & 
Aeronautics  2 1 1    3 1     1 9 
(3) Banking  12 12 6  2  13 18 6   1 4 74 
(4) Commerce  11 1 8  1  2 2 2   1 4 32 
(5) Communication & 
Show Business  1 4 1    5 4 3   1 4 23 
(6) Building & Real State  14 3 4    14 7 6 4  2  54 
(7) Consumer Industries  5 1 4     1 1 1   3 16 
(8) Power  3  2  1  10 3 2    1 22 
(9) Electric Equipment        4   1    5 
(10) Metallurgy & 
Machine Building  7  4  1  8 3 1   2 1 27 
(11) Mining  1 1 2    3 3      10 
(12) Chemistry  3 2 4    11 2 9 6    37 
(13) Insurance  1      1 4  1  1  8 
(14) Services  6 3 4    1 3 5 1   1 24 
(15) Iron & Steel  3      4 5 1 1   1 15 
(16) Textiles  15 14 11  2  5 4 5 1  1 1 59 
(17) Transportation  8 2 3    6 5 4 2    30 
(18) Miscellany    1    2  2    1 6 
(19) SECTORS  112 54 60  10  100 73 54 21  13 25 522 
(20) ENTREPRENEURS  64 33 35  6  47 40 31 13  7 12 288 
(21) AVERAGE  1,75 1,64 1,71  1,67  2,13 1,83 1,74 1,62  1,86 2,08 1,81 
(22) STANDARD 



























(1) Agriculture & Food  11 2   12 25 
(2) Automobile & Aeronautics  1    2 3 
(3) Banking  5 1 1  26 33 
(4) Commerce   2   2 4 
(5) Communication & Show 
Business  1    6 7 
(6) Building & Real State  6 1   12 19 
(7) Consumer Industries  1 3   2 6 
(8) Power  2    9 11 
(9) Electric Equipment      1 1 
(10) Metallurgy & Machine 
Building   1 1  7 9 
(11) Mining  2 1   6 9 
(12) Chemistry  1 2   12 15 
(13) Insurance  1    5 6 
(14) Services  1 2   2 5 
(15) Iron & Steel  2    7 9 
(16) Textiles  5    3 8 
(17) Transportation  2    6 8 
(18) Miscellany      1 1 
(19) SECTORS  41 15 2  121 179 
(20) ENTREPRENEURS  24 10 2  65 101 
(21) AVERAGE  1,71 1,50 1,00  1,86 1,77 
(22) STANDARD DEVIATION  2,79 0,67 0,00  5,93 8,11 
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(1) Agriculture & Food  5 6 2    2 3 3   3 1 25 
(2) Automobile & 
Aeronautics  1       1     1 3 
(3) Banking  4 1 1  1  7 12 5    2 33 
(4) Commerce    2      1    1 4 
(5) Communication & 
Show Business   1     3 2 1     7 
(6) Building & Real State  4 2 1    8 3  1    19 
(7) Consumer Industries  1  3     1     1 6 
(8) Power  2      5 2 2     11 
(9) Electric Equipment        1       1 
(10) Metallurgy & 
Machine Building    1  1  4 2 1     9 
(11) Mining  1 1 1    3 3      9 
(12) Chemistry   1 2    5 1 4 2    15 
(13) Insurance  1       4  1    6 
(14) Services  1  2    1  1     5 
(15) Iron & Steel  2      1 4 1    1 9 
(16) Textiles  1 4      1 2     8 
(17) Transportation  1 1     2 3 1     8 
(18) Miscellany              1 1 
(19) SECTORS  24 17 15  2  42 42 22 4  3 8 179 
(20) ENTREPRENEURS  13 11 10  2  23 23 10 3  2 4 101 
(21) AVERAGE  1,85 1,55 1,50  1,00  1,83 1,83 2,20 1,33  1,50 2,00 1,77 
(22) STANDARD 


























(1) Agriculture & Food  23 27 15 6 18 89 
(2) Automobile & Aeronautics  16 47 11 2 35 111 
(3) Banking  14 14 14 16 51 109 
(4) Commerce  43 25 19 9 19 115 
(5) Communication & Show 
Business  27 19 19 2 28 95 
(6) Building & Real State  20 31 13 3 13 80 
(7) Consumer Industries  18 20 5 4 27 74 
(8) Power  10 23 5  32 70 
(9) Electric Equipment  4 9 5 2 13 33 
(10) Metallurgy & Machine 
Building  29 58 14 8 36 145 
(11) Mining  11 14 5 4 23 57 
(12) Chemistry  15 10 12 2 33 72 
(13) Insurance  6 7 5 3 3 24 
(14) Services  14 27  2 11 54 
(15) Iron & Steel  12 18 6 4 25 65 
(16) Textiles  28 31 17 4 20 100 
(17) Transportation  34 38 21 9 52 154 
(18) Miscellany  12 15 11 2 43 83 
(19) SECTORS  336 433 197 82 482 1530 
(20) ENTREPRENEURS  262 355 148 55 361 1181 
(21) AVERAGE  1,28 1,22 1,33 1,49 1,34 1,30 
(22) STANDARD DEVIATION  9,93 13,05 5,43 3,67 13,13 33,31 
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(1) Agriculture & Food  15 8 21 6 15 6 1 1 2 5 4 4 1 89 
(2) Automobile & 
Aeronautics  10 6 19 28 11 2 14 2 1 5 3 5 5 111 
(3) Banking  8 6 11 3 14 16 1 7 5  19 5 14 109 
(4) Commerce  28 15 23 2 19 9  1 3 2 2 5 6 115 
(5) Communication & 
Show Business  16 11 13 6 19 2 4 3 4 2 9 2 4 95 
(6) Building & Real State  14 6 21 10 13 3 2 2 1 1 3 3 1 80 
(7) Consumer Industries  9 9 17 3 5 4 7 1 2 5 5 6 1 74 
(8) Power  3 7 7 16 5  17 1 2 5 3 3 1 70 
(9) Electric Equipment  1 3 1 8 5 2 6 1 1 2   2 1 33 
(10) Metallurgy & 
Machine Building  18 11 33 25 14 8 9 5  8 3 2 9 145 
(11) Mining  8 3 5 9 5 4 4 3  3 11  2 57 
(12) Chemistry  10 5 7 3 12 2 3 1 3 19 2 3 2 72 
(13) Insurance  3 3 2 5 5 3  1   2   24 
(14) Services  7 7 3 24  2  1 2 2 6   54 
(15) Iron & Steel  8 4 10 8 6 4 6 2  5 9 1 2 65 
(16) Textiles  23 5 30 1 17 4  1 3 3 9  4 100 
(17) Transportation  23 11 14 24 21 9 11 3 1 5 18 6 8 154 
(18) Miscellany  11 1 4 11 11 2 3 6 3 5 16 4 6 83 
(19) SECTORS  215 121 241 192 197 82 88 42 33 77 124 51 67 1530 
(20) ENTREPRENEURS  169 93 201 154 148 55 65 30 24 53 93 43 53 1181 
(21) AVERAGE  1,27 1,30 1,20 1,25 1,33 1,49 1,35 1,40 1,38 1,45 1,33 1,19 1,26 1,30 
(22) STANDARD 


























(1) Agriculture & Food  2 3 3 1 5 14 
(2) Automobile & Aeronautics   8 1  7 16 
(3) Banking  2 3 2 1 2 10 
(4) Commerce  6  2 1 3 12 
(5) Communication & Show 
Business  5 2 5  6 18 
(6) Building & Real State   2 3  2 7 
(7) Consumer Industries  1 2   7 10 
(8) Power    1  2 3 
(9) Electric Equipment  1    2 3 
(10) Metallurgy & Machine 
Building   5  1 3 9 
(11) Mining      3 3 
(12) Chemistry  3 1 2 1 5 12 
(13) Insurance    2 1  3 
(14) Services  1 2  1 3 7 
(15) Iron & Steel   2   1 3 
(16) Textiles  2 2   1 5 
(17) Transportation  1 3 3 3 2 12 
(18) Miscellany    1 0 4 5 
(19) SECTORS  24 35 25 10 58 152 
(20) ENTREPRENEURS  16 24 14 6 42 102 
(21) AVERAGE  1,50 1,46 1,79 1,67 1,38 1,49 
(22) STANDARD DEVIATION  1,69 1,80 1,14 0,74 1,88 4,70 
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(1) Agriculture & Food   2 3  3 1   2  2 1   14 
(2) Automobile & 
Aeronautics    3 5 1  4  1    1 1 16 
(3) Banking  1 1 2 1 2 1  1     1  10 
(4) Commerce  5 1   2 1   1 1    1 12 
(5) Communication & 
Show Business  3 2 2  5    3    2 1 18 
(6) Building & Real State    2  3    1  1   7 
(7) Consumer Industries  1  1 1   1  2  2 1 1 10 
(8) Power      1  1   1     3 
(9) Electric Equipment  1      1      1  3 
(10) Metallurgy & 
Machine Building    2 3  1 2 1       9 
(11) Mining        2    1   3 
(12) Chemistry  2 1  1 2 1  1 1 2    1 12 
(13) Insurance      2 1         3 
(14) Services  1   2  1   2  1   7 
(15) Iron & Steel    2        1   3 
(16) Textiles  2  1 1      1     5 
(17) Transportation   1 1 2 3 3 1       1 12 
(18) Miscellany      1   1   1 2  5 
(19) SECTORS  16 8 19 16 25 10 12 4 13 5 9 9 6 152 
(20) ENTREPRENEURS  12 4 14 10 14 6 9 2 9 4 6 7 5 102 
(21) AVERAGE  1,33 2,00 1,36 1,60 1,79 1,67 1,33 2,00 1,44 1,25 1,50 1,29 1,20 1,49 
(22) STANDARD 



























(1) Agriculture & Food  1 5 1  2 9 
(2) Automobile & Aeronautics   2   3 5 
(3) Banking   2  2 4 8 
(4) Commerce  3 4 3 1 3 14 
(5) Communication & Show Business  2  3 1 3 9 
(6) Building & Real State  1 1   1 3 
(7) Consumer Industries  1 1    2 
(8) Power   1   1 2 
(9) Electric Equipment   1 1  1 3 
(10) Metallurgy & Machine Building  1 8 5 1 6 21 
(11) Mining  2 4 1 1 1 9 
(12) Chemistry  1 2 2  4 9 
(13) Insurance  1     1 
(14) Services  4 1   1 6 
(15) Iron & Steel  5 2 4  7 18 
(16) Textiles  2 5 3 1 1 12 
(17) Transportation  1 3 2  3 9 
(18) Miscellany      2 2 
(19) SECTORS  25 42 25 7 43 142 
(20) ENTREPRENEURS  19 37 16 4 24 100 
(21) AVERAGE  1,32 1,14 1,56 1,75 1,79 1,42 
























































(1) Agriculture & Food  1  4 1 1  1      1   9 
(2) Automobile & 
Aeronautics    1 1   1   2     5 
(3) Banking    2   2     3  1 8 
(4) Commerce  1 2 4  3 1    1    2 14 
(5) Communication & 
Show Business   2   3 1    1 2   9 
(6) Building & Real State   1  1      1     3 
(7) Consumer Industries  1  1            2 
(8) Power     1      1     2 
(9) Electric Equipment    1  1     1     3 
(10) Metallurgy & 
Machine Building  1  4 4 5 1 2 2  1   1  21 
(11) Mining  2  1 3 1 1     1   9 
(12) Chemistry  1  2  2     4     9 
(13) Insurance  1              1 
(14) Services  2 2  1       1   6 
(15) Iron & Steel  5  1 1 4  1   3 2  1 18 
(16) Textiles  2  5  3 1     1   12 
(17) Transportation  1  3  2     2 1   9 
(18) Miscellany            2   2 
(19) SECTORS  18 7 29 13 25 7 5 2  17 13 2 4 142 
(20) ENTREPRENEURS  14 5 26 11 16 4 2 1  7 9 2 3 100 
(21) AVERAGE  1,29 1,40 1,12 1,18 1,56 1,75 2,50 2,00  2,43 1,44 1,00 1,33 1,42 
(22) STANDARD 




TABLE C.5.1 . EDUCATION OF SPANISH ENTREPRENEURS, SELF-MADE AND THE REST  
(percentages) 






(1) All  
 
(2) Elite  
 
(3) Valencian  
 
(4) Catalan  
 
(1) Elem-NotKnow  32,6 14,6 47,5 28,3 
 




(3) Elem-NotKnow  34,7 32,1 43,6 32,2 
 
(4) University 52,4 58,5 47,3 49,2 
 
 
TABLE C.5.2.  EDUCATION OF ENGLISH ENTREPRENEURS, SELF-MADE AND THE REST  
(percentages) 
 





(1) All  
 
(2) Not Manager  
 
(3) Manager  
 
(4) Elite XIX  
 
(5) Elite XX  
 
(1) Elem-NotKnow  24,7 28,9 14,6 24,5 22,0 
 




(3) Elem-NotKnow  18,9 20,8 3,6 12,8 9,6 
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